chore(deps): sha2 0.11, whose digest no longer formats as hex on its own - #1323
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`Sha256::digest` returns a `hybrid_array::Array` under digest 0.11, and that
type has no `LowerHex` — so `format!("{:x}", ..)` in `watch_token_hash` stopped
compiling, which is why dependabot's own bump failed to build.
`hex::encode` writes the same lowercase hex those rows already hold, so the
`watch_tokens` records written by a running agent stay valid across the upgrade.
Supersedes #1321, which moved the version and left the call site.
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Inline comments:
In `@monitor/src/api/server.rs`:
- Around line 417-420: Update the watch_tokens_are_hashed_expiring_and_revocable
test to seed the stored hash with the fixed SHA-256 literal for “abc” and verify
the token against that value, rather than deriving it through watch_token_hash;
leave the production hashing implementation unchanged.
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…t produce The test hashed the token through `watch_token_hash` on both sides, so it agreed with itself whatever the encoding became — which is exactly what this branch changes. An agent's `watch_tokens` rows outlive the build that wrote them, and a changed encoding invalidates every paired watch with no error. Seeded with the published SHA-256 of `abc` instead.
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- The documented static/musl monitor image cannot build because the standalone Dockerfile leaves sbm_native's path dependency outside the copied build tree. (monitor/Dockerfile)
📋 Additional findings from this change (not shown inline) (26)
- 🟠 High The declared reqwest feature graph violates the stated static/musl deployment contract: reqwest 0.13's
rustlsfeature unifies an aws-lc provider, and the checked-in lockfile includes aws-lc-sys with a cmake build dependency. Thus the Alpine/musl build still requires the AWS-LC/CMake toolchain despite the ring-only comments; on the provided Dockerfile builder, which installs onlymusl-dev, this can fail during dependency compilation (and at minimum is not the promised reproducible ring-only build). (monitor/Cargo.toml) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟠 High The login check is not concurrency-safe: every request performs
checkbefore any failure is recorded, so a burst of concurrent guesses can all pass the backoff gate and consume arbitrarily many password guesses before the first bcrypt completions update the counters. For example, sending 100 wrong requests concurrently when the map is empty causes all 100 handlers to observeNone, queue behind the verifier semaphore, and then record failures; the intended three free attempts and exponential delay therefore do not bound the burst. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟠 High Reaping a detached session removes only its map entry; it does not terminate the shell task or release the SSH/PTY resources.
drive_shell/drive_local_shelleach retain anArc<Session>, andSessionitself ownsinput: mpsc::Sender, so the task'sinput_rx.recv()cannot observe the documented “every sender gone” condition afterSessionStore::reap()drops the store's Arc. A quiet shell whose WebSocket disconnects and remains detached pastdetached_timeoutis therefore no longer attachable but continues holding its SSH channel/connection (or local PTY) indefinitely. This is exposed by the new reaper startup instart_server; it would be false only if the underlying shell is guaranteed to exit before the detached timeout or if reaping elsewhere also sends a close signal. (monitor/src/api/ws/session.rs) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟠 High The provided monitor Docker build cannot resolve the monitor's sbm_native path dependency. The manifest declares
sbm_native = { path = "../crates/sbm_native" }, butmonitor/Dockerfilecopies the manifest to/app/Cargo.toml, copies crates to/app/crates/, and only rewrites the sbm_parser path; Cargo therefore resolves sbm_native as/crates/sbm_native, outside the build context, and fails before compiling dependencies. This would be false only if the Docker build were never used or an external/crates/sbm_nativeexisted in the builder image. (monitor/Cargo.toml) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟠 High A failed web-server startup is reported but still exits successfully. If TLS PEM loading fails (missing/unreadable file, malformed certificate/key, or cert/key mismatch) or the bind fails,
start_serverreturns an error, buthandle_serveonly logs it inside thetokio::select!branch and then returnsOk(()). The process therefore exits with status 0 instead of failing startup, which can prevent systemd/container supervisors from restarting it and makes a broken TLS configuration look healthy to automation. This is false only if every deployment explicitly treats the log text as the health signal and does not use the process exit status. (monitor/src/cli/cli.rs) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟡 Medium A present account with a malformed bcrypt hash is distinguishable from both a missing account and a wrong password, and its attempt is not throttled.
verify_login_password_off_worker(...).await?propagates the bcryptMonitorError::Authbefore the commonrecord_failurebranch, so malformed rows return the framework's error response (401 for Auth, with the verifier error text) rather than the normal{"error":"Invalid credentials"}response, and repeated attempts never increment the IP/username counters. This violates equivalent missing-user/wrong-password behavior and lets hash corruption become an account oracle; a verifier/task failure also leaves throttle state inconsistent. The claim is false only if an upstream invariant guarantees every stored hash is always valid bcrypt and no malformed or verifier-error result can reach this handler, but the schema accepts arbitrary TEXT and existing migration fixtures insert a malformed hash. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟡 Medium Throttle username identity is not the same identity used to select the database account:
keys()lowercases the username, while the login query usesWHERE username = ?against a default case-sensitive SQLite TEXT column. With distinct usersAdminandadmin, four failed attempts forAdminthrottleadminas well, and a successful login asAdminremoves theadmincounter; conversely failures foradmincan blockAdmin. Thus success/failure recording does not apply to the selected username identity and can cause cross-account throttling/reset, violating the scope's identity consistency invariant. This would be false only if username uniqueness/matching is enforced case-insensitively elsewhere, but the shown schema's UNIQUE constraint has no NOCASE collation and the query does not normalize or use a case-insensitive comparison. (monitor/src/api/ratelimit.rs) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟡 Medium A successful login does not reliably clear the counters under concurrent requests: a wrong-password request can pass
check, pause in password verification, then callrecord_failureafter a correct request has calledrecord_successand removed both keys. Several such in-flight failures can recreate a penalty immediately after the success, so the documented success-clearing invariant is violated and a legitimate user can remain/throttle again despite authenticating successfully. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟡 Medium Concurrent watch-token issuance for the same
(subject, client_id)can invalidate a token that has already been returned to a client. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — per-file-budget - 🟡 Medium Bearer authentication parsing is unnecessarily case-sensitive and rejects valid bearer authorization schemes. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — per-file-budget
- 🟡 Medium Missing cumulative counter samples can produce fabricated positive rates. When an entire bucket has NULL network or disk-I/O values,
avg(...)is NULL buttry_get(...).unwrap_or(0.0)converts it to zero; the next bucket then computes(current - 0) / dt, reporting a large transfer from a missing baseline instead of leaving the rate unavailable or resetting the baseline. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — per-file-budget - 🟡 Medium The endpoint can return more than the documented 300 buckets for most short windows.
bucket_secsuses floor division, so e.g.minutes=7gives a one-second? (actually 420-second window / 300 => 1-second bucket), producing up to 420 epoch buckets rather than at most 300; the same occurs for every 6–9 minute request (and other non-divisible windows). This breaks the response-size/aggregation contract and can make the frontend render substantially more points than expected. It would be disproven if the query were independently shown to cap/group rows to 300, but it has no such cap. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — per-file-budget - 🟡 Medium The PUT validator rejects threshold strings that the monitoring threshold consumer accepts, so valid rules cannot be saved through the settings API. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — per-file-budget
- 🟡 Medium A large accepted idle-pause threshold disables extended monitoring permanently (until another setting write) due to an overflowing u64-to-i64 cast. (monitor/src/monitoring/monitoring.rs) — anchor-outside-diff
- 🟡 Medium Saving a null extended interval after changing the restart-only core interval publishes a live cadence derived from a value the running loop does not use. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — per-file-budget
- 🟡 Medium The settings and card-order read-modify-write path silently deletes unknown TOML configuration data, violating preservation of unrelated sections. (monitor/src/core/config_file.rs) — anchor-outside-diff
- 🟡 Medium PUT /card-order accepts duplicate known IDs and the panel renders duplicate cards instead of a valid permutation. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — per-file-budget
- 🟡 Medium Rapid consecutive drag-and-drop operations can leave the persisted order different from the order currently shown. Each drop sends a complete replacement asynchronously via
void api.updateCardOrder(cardOrder).catch(() => {})without sequencing or versioning; if the first PUT is delayed and the second completes first, the delayed first PUT acquires the backend's config lock later and overwrites the newer order. A reload or another browser then reads the stale arrangement. This is false only if the transport/server guarantees completion order for these independent PUTs, or users are prevented from making another drop until the prior request finishes. (monitor/frontend/src/pages/Dashboard.svelte) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟡 Medium
is_extended_cyclefloors the interval ratio, so an extended interval is routinely scheduled earlier than configured. For example, withinterval_seconds = 7andextended_interval_secs = 60,extended_everyis8and the extended script runs every 56 seconds (and with 10/7 it runs every 7 seconds), violating the configured minimum cadence. This is introduced by the new ratio-based runtime scheduling; it would be disproved if the product explicitly defines the setting as a floor/truncated number of core cycles rather than a seconds interval, but the field and config docs describe it as seconds. Use a ceiling ratio (or an elapsed-time deadline) if the invariant is that extended work is not more frequent than requested. (monitor/src/monitoring/monitoring.rs) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟡 Medium
config validatedoes not validate the configured TLS material at all. It callsConfig::load(), which only deserializes TOML/JSON and applies a few overrides;load_rustls_configis only reached later bystart_server. Thus a configuration containing[server.tls]with a missing file, malformed PEM, or a certificate/key mismatch printsConfiguration is valid, then fails only whenservestarts. This is false only if the CLI'sconfig validatecommand is intentionally documented as syntax-only rather than validating all startup-critical configuration. (monitor/src/cli/cli.rs) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟡 Medium Database failures on authenticated endpoints are returned with internal SQL error details in the JSON error body. (monitor/src/utils/error.rs) — anchor-outside-diff
- 🟡 Medium The panel's full-access kill switch does not remain effective across restart when
SBM_FULL_ACCESS=1is set.disable_full_accesspersistsremote.full_access = Some(false), butRemoteAccessConfig::resolveevaluatesfull_access_from_env().or(self.full_access), so the environment value wins andAppState::newreconstructsremote_access.full_access = true; capabilities then reportsfull_access: trueand local-shell admission is reopened after restart despite the endpoint documenting the disable as permanent. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — per-file-budget - 🟡 Medium The settings and card-order read-modify-write paths silently delete unrelated configuration keys that are not represented by the Rust structs.
config_file::readdeserializes directly intoConfig, and serde ignores unknown TOML keys by default;config_file::writethen serializes only known fields. For example, a deployment with[server] host=...,port=..., and a future/agent-specificmetrics_bind=...losesmetrics_bindafter PUT/api/v1/card-order(and any settings PUT), despite that handler changing onlycard_order; this is false only if the configuration contract guarantees that files never contain unknown/forward-version fields. Evidence: the handlers read a typedConfigand write it back, whileConfighas no flattened catch-all for unknown TOML fields (its flatten is only the explicitly enumerated legacy Go keys, which are skipped on serialization). (monitor/src/core/config_file.rs) — anchor-outside-diff - 🟡 Medium Metrics history is not isolated to the monitor's current server identity. The SQL query filters only by timestamp, so rows written under an older server name (for example after changing
server.name, or rows imported into a shared database) are averaged into the current series and their counters are used for the next bucket's rate. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — anchor-unreliable - 🟡 Medium
GET /api/v1/metrics/historycan return and average samples belonging to a different server identity because its SQL window has noserver_namepredicate. If the monitor is restarted afterserver.namechanges (or a DB contains legacy/imported rows for another name), the response for the current server mixes the old server's CPU, memory, disk, counters, temperature, and battery data into the current server's history; the counter deltas can also produce incorrect rates across the identity boundary. This is inconsistent with the velocity history helper, which is explicitly called with the current server name, and with the table's server-name index/column. (monitor/src/api/server.rs) — anchor-unreliable - ⚪ Info Dependency
rustls-pemfile@2.2.0is affected by info advisory RUSTSEC-2025-0134 (rustls-pemfile is unmaintained); no fixed version is available yet. (Cargo.lock) — dependency-evidence
📚 Preexisting issues (unrelated to this change) (4)
- 🟠 High Dependency
brace-expansion@5.0.7is affected by high advisory GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg (brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded expansion length causing an out-of-memory process crash); upgrade to at least 5.0.8. (monitor/frontend/package-lock.json) — dependency-evidence - 🟠 High Dependency
brace-expansion@5.0.7is affected by high advisory GHSA-rgw5-rvv9-x895 (brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation); upgrade to at least 1.1.18. (monitor/frontend/package-lock.json) — dependency-evidence - ⚪ Info Dependency
rsa@0.10.0-rc.18is affected by info advisory RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels); no fixed version is available yet. (Cargo.lock) — dependency-evidence - ⚪ Info Dependency
rsa@0.9.10is affected by info advisory RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels); no fixed version is available yet. (Cargo.lock) — dependency-evidence
❓ Low-evidence leads (not confirmed — verify before acting) (1)
- The throttle map is not actually bounded despite the TTL/pruning design: pruning only removes entries whose
last_seenis older than one hour, so an attacker can submit failures with continuously fresh, distinct usernames (or IPs) and keep every entry live. Once the map exceedsPRUNE_THRESHOLD,retainremoves nothing and each request adds anotherUserkey, allowing memory growth proportional to the attacker's request volume for the TTL window and potentially an unbounded long-running memory DoS. (monitor/src/api/ratelimit.rs)
🤖 Prompt for AI agents — all findings (30)
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
## Additional findings on this change (not posted inline) (26)
In monitor/Cargo.toml around line 59, address this finding:
The declared reqwest feature graph violates the stated static/musl deployment contract: reqwest 0.13's `rustls` feature unifies an aws-lc provider, and the checked-in lockfile includes aws-lc-sys with a cmake build dependency. Thus the Alpine/musl build still requires the AWS-LC/CMake toolchain despite the ring-only comments; on the provided Dockerfile builder, which installs only `musl-dev`, this can fail during dependency compilation (and at minimum is not the promised reproducible ring-only build).
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 362, address this finding:
The login check is not concurrency-safe: every request performs `check` before any failure is recorded, so a burst of concurrent guesses can all pass the backoff gate and consume arbitrarily many password guesses before the first bcrypt completions update the counters. For example, sending 100 wrong requests concurrently when the map is empty causes all 100 handlers to observe `None`, queue behind the verifier semaphore, and then record failures; the intended three free attempts and exponential delay therefore do not bound the burst.
In monitor/src/api/ws/session.rs around line 302, address this finding:
Reaping a detached session removes only its map entry; it does not terminate the shell task or release the SSH/PTY resources. `drive_shell`/`drive_local_shell` each retain an `Arc<Session>`, and `Session` itself owns `input: mpsc::Sender`, so the task's `input_rx.recv()` cannot observe the documented “every sender gone” condition after `SessionStore::reap()` drops the store's Arc. A quiet shell whose WebSocket disconnects and remains detached past `detached_timeout` is therefore no longer attachable but continues holding its SSH channel/connection (or local PTY) indefinitely. This is exposed by the new reaper startup in `start_server`; it would be false only if the underlying shell is guaranteed to exit before the detached timeout or if reaping elsewhere also sends a close signal.
In monitor/Cargo.toml around line 15, address this finding:
The provided monitor Docker build cannot resolve the monitor's sbm_native path dependency. The manifest declares `sbm_native = { path = "../crates/sbm_native" }`, but `monitor/Dockerfile` copies the manifest to `/app/Cargo.toml`, copies crates to `/app/crates/`, and only rewrites the sbm_parser path; Cargo therefore resolves sbm_native as `/crates/sbm_native`, outside the build context, and fails before compiling dependencies. This would be false only if the Docker build were never used or an external `/crates/sbm_native` existed in the builder image.
In monitor/src/cli/cli.rs around line 157, address this finding:
A failed web-server startup is reported but still exits successfully. If TLS PEM loading fails (missing/unreadable file, malformed certificate/key, or cert/key mismatch) or the bind fails, `start_server` returns an error, but `handle_serve` only logs it inside the `tokio::select!` branch and then returns `Ok(())`. The process therefore exits with status 0 instead of failing startup, which can prevent systemd/container supervisors from restarting it and makes a broken TLS configuration look healthy to automation. This is false only if every deployment explicitly treats the log text as the health signal and does not use the process exit status.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 382, address this finding:
A present account with a malformed bcrypt hash is distinguishable from both a missing account and a wrong password, and its attempt is not throttled. `verify_login_password_off_worker(...).await?` propagates the bcrypt `MonitorError::Auth` before the common `record_failure` branch, so malformed rows return the framework's error response (401 for Auth, with the verifier error text) rather than the normal `{"error":"Invalid credentials"}` response, and repeated attempts never increment the IP/username counters. This violates equivalent missing-user/wrong-password behavior and lets hash corruption become an account oracle; a verifier/task failure also leaves throttle state inconsistent. The claim is false only if an upstream invariant guarantees every stored hash is always valid bcrypt and no malformed or verifier-error result can reach this handler, but the schema accepts arbitrary TEXT and existing migration fixtures insert a malformed hash.
In monitor/src/api/ratelimit.rs around line 141, address this finding:
Throttle username identity is not the same identity used to select the database account: `keys()` lowercases the username, while the login query uses `WHERE username = ?` against a default case-sensitive SQLite TEXT column. With distinct users `Admin` and `admin`, four failed attempts for `Admin` throttle `admin` as well, and a successful login as `Admin` removes the `admin` counter; conversely failures for `admin` can block `Admin`. Thus success/failure recording does not apply to the selected username identity and can cause cross-account throttling/reset, violating the scope's identity consistency invariant. This would be false only if username uniqueness/matching is enforced case-insensitively elsewhere, but the shown schema's UNIQUE constraint has no NOCASE collation and the query does not normalize or use a case-insensitive comparison.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 391, address this finding:
A successful login does not reliably clear the counters under concurrent requests: a wrong-password request can pass `check`, pause in password verification, then call `record_failure` after a correct request has called `record_success` and removed both keys. Several such in-flight failures can recreate a penalty immediately after the success, so the documented success-clearing invariant is violated and a legitimate user can remain/throttle again despite authenticating successfully.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 454, address this finding:
Concurrent watch-token issuance for the same `(subject, client_id)` can invalidate a token that has already been returned to a client.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 1153, address this finding:
Bearer authentication parsing is unnecessarily case-sensitive and rejects valid bearer authorization schemes.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 1005, address this finding:
Missing cumulative counter samples can produce fabricated positive rates. When an entire bucket has NULL network or disk-I/O values, `avg(...)` is NULL but `try_get(...).unwrap_or(0.0)` converts it to zero; the next bucket then computes `(current - 0) / dt`, reporting a large transfer from a missing baseline instead of leaving the rate unavailable or resetting the baseline.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 989, address this finding:
The endpoint can return more than the documented 300 buckets for most short windows. `bucket_secs` uses floor division, so e.g. `minutes=7` gives a one-second? (actually 420-second window / 300 => 1-second bucket), producing up to 420 epoch buckets rather than at most 300; the same occurs for every 6–9 minute request (and other non-divisible windows). This breaks the response-size/aggregation contract and can make the frontend render substantially more points than expected. It would be disproven if the query were independently shown to cap/group rows to 300, but it has no such cap.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 774, address this finding:
The PUT validator rejects threshold strings that the monitoring threshold consumer accepts, so valid rules cannot be saved through the settings API.
In monitor/src/monitoring/monitoring.rs around line 227, address this finding:
A large accepted idle-pause threshold disables extended monitoring permanently (until another setting write) due to an overflowing u64-to-i64 cast.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 841, address this finding:
Saving a null extended interval after changing the restart-only core interval publishes a live cadence derived from a value the running loop does not use.
In monitor/src/core/config_file.rs around line 67, address this finding:
The settings and card-order read-modify-write path silently deletes unknown TOML configuration data, violating preservation of unrelated sections.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 943, address this finding:
PUT /card-order accepts duplicate known IDs and the panel renders duplicate cards instead of a valid permutation.
In monitor/frontend/src/pages/Dashboard.svelte around line 88, address this finding:
Rapid consecutive drag-and-drop operations can leave the persisted order different from the order currently shown. Each drop sends a complete replacement asynchronously via `void api.updateCardOrder(cardOrder).catch(() => {})` without sequencing or versioning; if the first PUT is delayed and the second completes first, the delayed first PUT acquires the backend's config lock later and overwrites the newer order. A reload or another browser then reads the stale arrangement. This is false only if the transport/server guarantees completion order for these independent PUTs, or users are prevented from making another drop until the prior request finishes.
In monitor/src/monitoring/monitoring.rs around line 214, address this finding:
`is_extended_cycle` floors the interval ratio, so an extended interval is routinely scheduled earlier than configured. For example, with `interval_seconds = 7` and `extended_interval_secs = 60`, `extended_every` is `8` and the extended script runs every 56 seconds (and with 10/7 it runs every 7 seconds), violating the configured minimum cadence. This is introduced by the new ratio-based runtime scheduling; it would be disproved if the product explicitly defines the setting as a floor/truncated number of core cycles rather than a seconds interval, but the field and config docs describe it as seconds. Use a ceiling ratio (or an elapsed-time deadline) if the invariant is that extended work is not more frequent than requested.
In monitor/src/cli/cli.rs around line 219, address this finding:
`config validate` does not validate the configured TLS material at all. It calls `Config::load()`, which only deserializes TOML/JSON and applies a few overrides; `load_rustls_config` is only reached later by `start_server`. Thus a configuration containing `[server.tls]` with a missing file, malformed PEM, or a certificate/key mismatch prints `Configuration is valid`, then fails only when `serve` starts. This is false only if the CLI's `config validate` command is intentionally documented as syntax-only rather than validating all startup-critical configuration.
In monitor/src/utils/error.rs around line 62, address this finding:
Database failures on authenticated endpoints are returned with internal SQL error details in the JSON error body.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs around line 881, address this finding:
The panel's full-access kill switch does not remain effective across restart when `SBM_FULL_ACCESS=1` is set. `disable_full_access` persists `remote.full_access = Some(false)`, but `RemoteAccessConfig::resolve` evaluates `full_access_from_env().or(self.full_access)`, so the environment value wins and `AppState::new` reconstructs `remote_access.full_access = true`; capabilities then reports `full_access: true` and local-shell admission is reopened after restart despite the endpoint documenting the disable as permanent.
In monitor/src/core/config_file.rs around line 60, address this finding:
The settings and card-order read-modify-write paths silently delete unrelated configuration keys that are not represented by the Rust structs. `config_file::read` deserializes directly into `Config`, and serde ignores unknown TOML keys by default; `config_file::write` then serializes only known fields. For example, a deployment with `[server] host=...`, `port=...`, and a future/agent-specific `metrics_bind=...` loses `metrics_bind` after PUT `/api/v1/card-order` (and any settings PUT), despite that handler changing only `card_order`; this is false only if the configuration contract guarantees that files never contain unknown/forward-version fields. Evidence: the handlers read a typed `Config` and write it back, while `Config` has no flattened catch-all for unknown TOML fields (its flatten is only the explicitly enumerated legacy Go keys, which are skipped on serialization).
In monitor/src/api/server.rs, address this finding:
Metrics history is not isolated to the monitor's current server identity. The SQL query filters only by timestamp, so rows written under an older server name (for example after changing `server.name`, or rows imported into a shared database) are averaged into the current series and their counters are used for the next bucket's rate.
In monitor/src/api/server.rs, address this finding:
`GET /api/v1/metrics/history` can return and average samples belonging to a different server identity because its SQL window has no `server_name` predicate. If the monitor is restarted after `server.name` changes (or a DB contains legacy/imported rows for another name), the response for the current server mixes the old server's CPU, memory, disk, counters, temperature, and battery data into the current server's history; the counter deltas can also produce incorrect rates across the identity boundary. This is inconsistent with the velocity history helper, which is explicitly called with the current server name, and with the table's server-name index/column.
In Cargo.lock, address this finding:
Dependency `rustls-pemfile@2.2.0` is affected by info advisory RUSTSEC-2025-0134 (rustls-pemfile is unmaintained); no fixed version is available yet.
## Preexisting issues, unrelated to this change — fix only if asked (4)
In monitor/frontend/package-lock.json, address this finding:
Dependency `brace-expansion@5.0.7` is affected by high advisory GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg (brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded expansion length causing an out-of-memory process crash); upgrade to at least 5.0.8.
In monitor/frontend/package-lock.json, address this finding:
Dependency `brace-expansion@5.0.7` is affected by high advisory GHSA-rgw5-rvv9-x895 (brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation); upgrade to at least 1.1.18.
In Cargo.lock, address this finding:
Dependency `rsa@0.10.0-rc.18` is affected by info advisory RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels); no fixed version is available yet.
In Cargo.lock, address this finding:
Dependency `rsa@0.9.10` is affected by info advisory RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels); no fixed version is available yet.
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Supersedes #1321, which bumped
sha2from 0.10 to 0.11 and left the one callsite that no longer compiles.
Sha256::digestreturns ahybrid_array::Arrayunder digest 0.11, and thattype has no
LowerHex, somonitor/src/api/server.rs'sfails to build on every platform:
hex::encodewrites the same lowercase hex, so thewatch_tokensrows arunning agent already stores stay valid across the upgrade — the hash is a
lookup key, and changing its encoding would silently invalidate every paired
watch.
hexis a new direct dependency ofmonitorand was already inCargo.lockas a transitive one.
sha2 0.11.0was likewise already in the tree; six othercrates still pull
0.10.9, so both remain.Verification
cargo check -p server_box_monitor --all-targets— cleancargo test -p server_box_monitor— 18 test binaries, 0 failuresSummary by CodeRabbit
Summary
Changes