If you discover a security vulnerability in Brig, please report it responsibly.
Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Instead, please use GitHub Security Advisories to report vulnerabilities privately. Include:
- Description of the vulnerability.
- Steps to reproduce.
- Affected versions.
- Potential impact.
Brig's security model relies on the following boundaries:
- Lima VM: The only hard security boundary protecting macOS from untrusted workloads.
- gVisor (runsc): Defense-in-depth inside the VM. Not a security boundary.
- Per-cell networks: Isolation by network topology.
- Warden proxy: Mandatory egress choke point enforcing network policy.
Vulnerabilities that break these boundaries are considered critical.
- No east-west traffic between cells.
- Warden cannot be abused as a gateway.
- Secrets are observable (exfiltration is detectable), not preventable.
- macOS state directory is untrusted.
- gVisor must be active (no silent downgrade).
- Only Warden may attach to the proxy-external network.
- No privileged services on cell networks.
- Cells must be single-homed (one network only).
- Warden must be running before cells start.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.2.x | Yes |
| < 0.2 | No |