ci(security): tamper-evidence for deny.toml and security.yml (LAB-1151) - #68
ci(security): tamper-evidence for deny.toml and security.yml (LAB-1151)#6827Bslash6 wants to merge 2 commits into
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The supply-chain gate read its policy and its own definition from the PR head, so one commit could violate a ban and remove the ban. Deletion already fails closed (required context, no bypass actors); this adds the modification half: a tripwire step that diffs deny.toml and security.yml against the PR base and fails the required check unless the PR body carries [gate-change-approved]. Residual (documented in-step and in README): the tripwire itself lives in the PR head; removing it in the same commit is deliberate evasion, only closable by an org-ruleset workflows rule — escalated, not self-served.
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WalkthroughThe security workflow now compares pull request changes with ChangesSupply-chain gate
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The PR detects unauthorized changes to the security policy and workflow, but a pull request can still delete or replace that workflow and report the required check without running the protection. Because this could allow security enforcement to be bypassed, merging requires explicit owner acceptance or follow-up to move the protection to a trusted external workflow. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant GitHubActions
participant GitHistory
participant PullRequest
GitHubActions->>GitHistory: Compare relevant files with HEAD^1
GitHistory-->>GitHubActions: Return changed gate files
GitHubActions->>PullRequest: Read approval marker
PullRequest-->>GitHubActions: Return marker status
GitHubActions->>GitHubActions: Pass or fail the tamper check
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 0 files. (3 skipped: 3 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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In @.github/workflows/security.yml:
- Line 165: Move the tamper check out of the supply-chain job in
.github/workflows/security.yml at lines 165-165 into a trusted workflow hosted
in an external repository, enforced through an organisation ruleset, while
preserving the required GitHub Actions check name. Update README.md at lines
541-547 to document the limitation that this workflow cannot protect itself if
deleted.
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…l honestly The README bullet and the workflow comment both implied the shadow-workflow wire covers a same-named replacement check unconditionally. The wire lives in security.yml, so deleting that file and shipping the replacement in one commit removes the wire with it. Name that case explicitly as the first documented residual instead of claiming coverage; the mechanical closure (org workflows rule) stays escalated on LAB-1151 per the ticket's org-scope boundary. CodeRabbit-Resolved: security.yml:165:Move the tamper check outside
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Closes LAB-1151.
[gate-change-approved]— this PR modifiessecurity.ymlitself, so its own tamper check fires; this marker is the sanctioned path, and its presence here is the live positive test of the warning path. Sign-off: ray owns the merge decision on this PR, which is the sign-off.What
The required
supply-chaincheck read both its policy (deny.toml) and its own definition (security.yml) from the PR head, so one commit could violate a ban and delete the ban — green rollup, merges. Deletion already fails closed (required context,bypass_actors: []on ruleset 17788230, proven by the frozen PRs after #54); this PR closes the modification half:supply-chainjob. Diffsdeny.toml+security.ymlagainstHEAD^1(the base tip the merge commit was computed against — exact PR effect, no network fetch, no base-drift false positives; checkout gainsfetch-depth: 2). Any change fails the required check unless the PR body contains the exact case-sensitive string documented in README §Gate tamper-evidence.supply-chainname in a different workflow file. Any other changed workflow file mentioningsupply-chaintrips the wire too. (The API-commit-status variant of the same shadow is closed in the ruleset: thesupply-chaincontext is now pinned tointegration_id15368, the GitHub Actions app.)env:only and is matched bygrep -qFas data;set -o pipefailmakes a failinggit difffail the step rather than silently disarm it.What this deliberately does not defend against
Documented in README §Gate tamper-evidence: a PR that edits the tamper step itself out in the same commit, a self-served marker, and a marker hidden in an HTML comment. All deliberate evasion, not the lazy path this defends against. Mechanical closure of the first needs an org-ruleset
workflowsrule (verified available on this plan) — escalated on LAB-1151 for ray's decision, deliberately not self-served.Verification
refs/pull/N/merge): innocent PR passes, gate-file edit trips, shadow workflow trips, unrelated workflow deletion does not trip; marker matching is exact, case-sensitive, empty-body-safe.contains()). Full adjudication on LAB-1151.Docs
README §Gate tamper-evidence (new),
make securitywording, Makefile comment — all state what the gate does and does not defend against.Summary by CodeRabbit