Curated, auto-updating lists of major providers' own service IP ranges,
meant to be consumed as exclusions (allowlist carve-outs) by IP blocklists
such as bitwire-it/ipblocklist.
The point: a blocklist's DROP rules should never break legitimate provider
traffic (github.com, google.com, Microsoft 365, Apple, Meta, Telegram, Stripe
webhooks, Okta logins, Googlebot, …). Feed all-safe.txt into your blocklist as
an allowlist and those providers stay reachable while everything else is still
filtered.
These lists are not a blocklist and are not a general allowlist for browsing. They are exclusion feeds: "don't ever drop these, they're the provider talking to you."
We include a range only if it is exclusively the provider's own infrastructure — their websites, APIs, CDN front-ends for their own products, mail servers, crawlers, webhook sources, health-checkers.
We never put ranges where third-party / customer workloads run into the default list, because excluding those would blind your blocklist to real abuse:
- ❌ No cloud customer compute — AWS EC2, GCP compute (
cloud.json), Azure customer service tags, GitHub Actions / Dependabot / Copilot runner ranges, Datadog Synthetics private locations, Google's App Engine-hosted fetchers. The one deliberate exception is a handful of/28s that Google publishes as crawler addresses even though they sit incloud.json— Google naming them as its own crawler fleet is authoritative, and the carve-back is a few dozen addresses, not a cloud region. ⚠️ Shared CDN / proxy edges (Cloudflare, Fastly, CloudFront, bunny.net, Zscaler) are a gray zone: they proxy third-party sites — including abusive ones. These are generated into separate, opt-in files and are NOT inall-safe.txt.⚠️ Third-party-intent traffic from provider-owned IPs is the same gray zone, and it is the reason the AI feeds are split. A scheduled crawler (GPTBot, Googlebot, PerplexityBot, bingbot) fetches on the provider's own initiative → safe. A user-triggered fetcher (ChatGPT-User, Perplexity-User) fetches because an arbitrary third party asked it to → opt-in, exactly like an egress proxy. Same for Atlassian, whose egress pool is shared with Forge apps (third-party code) and Bitbucket Pipelines.
Only sources the provider itself publishes are ingested. No scraping HTML support pages, no third-party gists, no "cloud IP aggregator" sites. Where a provider publishes nothing machine-readable, it is listed under Not included rather than guessed at.
Aggregate of all safe (non-CDN, non-proxy, non-user-triggered) provider ranges — this is the one most consumers want:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bitwire-it/provider-safe-ip/main/lists/all-safe.txt
Per-provider files (same base path, lists/<name>.txt):
github.txt google.txt google-crawlers.txt microsoft365.txt
bingbot.txt apple.txt meta.txt telegram.txt
zoom.txt okta.txt stripe.txt datadog.txt
duckduckbot.txt openai.txt perplexity.txt aws-r53-healthchecks.txt
Opt-in (shared edge / proxy / user-triggered — not in all-safe.txt):
cloudflare.txt fastly.txt aws-cloudfront.txt bunny.txt
zscaler.txt atlassian.txt anthropic.txt openai-user-fetchers.txt
perplexity-user-fetchers.txt
Each file is plain text, one CIDR per line, IPv4 ranges first then IPv6,
collapsed and sorted ascending, with a trailing newline. Same source input
always produces byte-identical output, so git diffs are meaningful.
| List | Source | What it is / why it's safe |
|---|---|---|
github |
api.github.com/meta |
GitHub's own infra: hooks, web, api, git, pages, packages, github_enterprise_importer, importer. Excludes actions, dependabot, copilot — those are customer/third-party workloads on shared Azure ranges. |
google |
goog.json minus cloud.json |
goog is everything Google announces; cloud is GCP customer ranges. goog − cloud (CIDR subtraction) leaves Google's own services — Search, Gmail front-ends, YouTube, crawlers. GCP customer compute stays out. |
google-crawlers |
common-crawlers.json + special-crawlers.json |
Googlebot, AdsBot, APIs-Google, Google-Safety. Google's own fleets. Mostly a subset of google, but not entirely: the goog − cloud subtraction really does carve out crawler prefixes that also appear in cloud.json (at the last refresh, 23 of 95 — all /28s, one /27). Publishing the crawler feeds separately puts exactly those back, so Googlebot can never end up droppable. |
microsoft365 |
endpoints.office.com/endpoints/worldwide |
The ips arrays from Microsoft's official M365 endpoints service (Exchange Online, SharePoint, Teams, …). Does not ingest Azure service tags (customer ranges). |
bingbot |
bing.com/toolbox/bingbot.json |
Microsoft's search crawler fleet, published by Microsoft for bot verification. Additive: the M365 feed does not contain it. |
apple |
ARIN WHOIS (NET-17-0-0-0-1) |
17.0.0.0/8. Apple owns the entire legacy Class A block and uses it exclusively for its own services. Hardcoded — there is no per-service feed. Applebot's published ranges live inside this /8, so no separate list is needed. |
meta |
whois -h whois.radb.net -- '-i origin AS32934', RPKI-validated objects only |
facebook.com, instagram.com, whatsapp.com, threads.net + the Facebook crawler and webhook senders. AS32934 carries Meta's own production edge; Meta sells no compute on it. See Meta and the IRR for why only RPKI-derived route objects are kept. |
telegram |
core.telegram.org/resources/cidr.txt |
Telegram's published firewall list: its own datacenters, the Bot API, and the servers that call your registered bot webhook. |
zoom |
assets.zoom.us/docs/ipranges/Zoom.txt |
Zoom's published firewall list — Zoom's own meeting/media/web infrastructure, not customer compute. |
okta |
okta-ip-ranges/ip_ranges.json |
Every Okta service cell (a tenant can live in any of them). Okta's own auth and hook-sender addresses; an SSO login dropped by a blocklist locks people out of everything. |
stripe |
ips_api.json + ips_webhooks.json |
Stripe's API endpoints and webhook senders, published for firewall allowlisting. Bare IPs, read as /32s. |
datadog |
ip-ranges.datadoghq.com |
Datadog's own intake, webhook and Synthetics-probe addresses. Excludes synthetics-private-locations — those workers run inside the customer's network, not Datadog's. |
duckduckbot |
duckduckgo.com/duckduckbot.json |
DuckDuckGo's own crawler addresses, published for bot verification. |
openai |
gptbot.json + searchbot.json |
GPTBot and OAI-SearchBot: scheduled crawlers OpenAI runs itself. ChatGPT-User is not here (see opt-in). |
perplexity |
perplexitybot.json |
PerplexityBot, Perplexity's scheduled crawler. Perplexity-User is not here (see opt-in). |
aws-r53-healthchecks |
ip-ranges.amazonaws.com/ip-ranges.json, service == "ROUTE53_HEALTHCHECKS" |
AWS's own Route 53 health-check probe sources — AWS infrastructure, not customer workloads. |
| List | Source | Why it's opt-in |
|---|---|---|
cloudflare |
/ips-v4 + /ips-v6 |
Shared CDN edge — proxies third-party (including abusive) sites. |
fastly |
api.fastly.com/public-ip-list |
Shared CDN edge — same gray zone as Cloudflare. |
aws-cloudfront |
ip-ranges.amazonaws.com, service == "CLOUDFRONT" |
Shared CDN that fronts third-party customer sites. |
bunny |
api.bunny.net/system/edgeserverlist |
Shared CDN edge (flat array of bare edge IPs). |
zscaler |
config.zscaler.com/…/cenr/json |
Egress proxy. Zscaler-owned IPs, but ZEN nodes carry many organizations' outbound traffic, so abuse can egress through Zscaler. |
atlassian |
ip-ranges.atlassian.com |
Jira/Confluence/Bitbucket/Trello/Opsgenie — but the feed's own tags show one shared egress pool: the same prefixes are tagged forge (Atlassian's platform running third-party app code) and bitbucket (whose egress includes Pipelines build runners). Opt in if you need Atlassian webhooks to survive. |
anthropic |
claude.com/crawling/bots.json |
One undifferentiated file for ClaudeBot, Claude-SearchBot and Claude-User. Because the scheduled crawler cannot be separated from the user-triggered fetcher, the whole list is opt-in. |
openai-user-fetchers |
chatgpt-user.json |
ChatGPT-User fetches a URL because an arbitrary user or agent asked it to — provider-owned IPs, third-party-chosen targets. |
perplexity-user-fetchers |
perplexity-user.json |
Same shape as ChatGPT-User. |
Meta publishes no HTTPS feed. The source Meta itself documents (in the
crawler docs)
is an IRR query: whois -h whois.radb.net -- '-i origin AS32934'. The generator
runs exactly that query over TCP/43 with the standard library — and then keeps
only RPKI-derived route objects.
That filter is the whole point. Anyone can register a plain route: object in
RADB for a prefix they do not hold; an attacker registering one under
origin: AS32934 would otherwise land their own range in this exclusion feed and
whitelist themselves past every downstream blocklist. RADB also mirrors the RPKI
into route objects (source: RPKI # Trust Anchor: <rir>), which come from ROAs
cryptographically signed by the address holder under an RIR trust anchor and
cannot be forged by a third party. We trade a little completeness for a feed that
cannot be poisoned, and the generator refuses to write a suspiciously short
result rather than silently shrinking.
Meta's corporate ASNs (AS54115, AS63293) are deliberately excluded: they carry office/employee egress, not the services this feed exists to keep reachable.
The checklist below walks the ~30 most-visited sites worldwide (Similarweb; exact ranks move month to month) and records what each one actually publishes. Most of the world's biggest sites publish nothing machine-readable — that is a finding, not an omission, and the honest answer is a domain-based allowlist for those.
| Site | Status | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|
| google.com, youtube.com | ✅ full | google, google-crawlers |
| facebook.com, instagram.com, whatsapp.com | ✅ full | meta |
| chatgpt.com | openai — OpenAI publishes bot ranges; chatgpt.com itself is Cloudflare-fronted (see cloudflare, opt-in) |
|
| live.com, office.com, microsoftonline.com, microsoft.com | ✅ M365 services | microsoft365 |
| bing.com | bingbot — Microsoft publishes no serving-IP feed for bing.com |
|
| apple.com | ✅ full | apple (all of 17.0.0.0/8) |
| telegram.org | ✅ full | telegram |
| duckduckgo.com | duckduckbot |
|
| github.com | ✅ full | github |
| zoom.us | ✅ full | zoom |
| x.com | ❌ none | X publishes no IP feed for its services or crawler |
| reddit.com | ❌ none | Fastly-fronted; only fastly (opt-in) would cover it, and that edge is shared |
| wikipedia.org | ❌ none | Wikimedia documents its allocations only as wiki prose (wikitech.wikimedia.org) — no machine-readable feed to ingest |
| amazon.com | ❌ none | ip-ranges.json describes AWS customer space, not the retail site; there is no amazon.com-only feed |
| netflix.com | ❌ none | No published range list (Open Connect appliances live in ISP networks) |
| linkedin.com | ❌ none | No published IP feed; LinkedInBot is verified by reverse DNS |
| tiktok.com | ❌ none | No published IP feed |
| yandex.ru, dzen.ru | ❌ none | yandex.com/ips is an HTML page, not a feed — scraping it is against this project's rules; Yandex verifies its robots by reverse DNS |
| baidu.com | ❌ none | Baiduspider is verified by reverse DNS only |
| yahoo.com | ❌ none | No published IP feed |
| twitch.tv | ❌ none | Runs on AWS customer space; no service-specific feed |
| naver.com, vk.com | ❌ none | No published IP feed |
| pinterest.com | ❌ none | No published IP feed |
| temu.com, weather.com | ❌ none | No published IP feed |
| adult-video portals (pornhub.com, xvideos.com, …) | ❌ none | No published IP feeds |
Providers evaluated and deliberately skipped, because they publish no official machine-readable IP feed and this project will not scrape HTML support pages or ingest third-party gists. Where a provider is reachable another way, the recommended alternative is noted.
- Slack — no official machine-readable IP feed for its own services (runs on cloud infra, explicitly declines to publish static ranges). Allowlist by domain if needed.
- Zendesk / Salesforce — their published "IP ranges" endpoints reject programmatic requests (HTTP 403); the ranges exist only inside login-gated or bot-blocked help articles. Allowlist by domain.
- CrowdStrike — the canonical Falcon cloud IP list is published only behind
the Falcon portal login (
falcon.<region>.crowdstrike.com/documentation/…/ cloud-ip-addresses). The only machine-readable copies are third-party community gists, which this project will not ingest. Pull the list from your authenticated Falcon console, or allowlist by FQDN. - SentinelOne — no published static IP list. Allowlisting is domain/FQDN
based (
*.sentinelone.net, region/tenant specific) over multi-cloud + CDN with dynamic IPs. Allowlist by domain. - Blackpoint Cyber — no public IP/firewall documentation; connectivity requirements are provided only during onboarding/support. Nothing to ingest.
- Huntress — agent-to-cloud communication has no static IPs (runs on
AWS/Azure/Cloudflare, dynamic); Huntress documents allowlisting by domain
(
agent.huntress.io,eetee.huntress.io,update.huntress.io,eetee.huntresscdn.com, plus*.bugsnag.com). The only static ranges are two/28s used for Huntress → your PSA/SIEM outbound, published solely in a bot-blocked support article that is actively changing during their AWS→Azure migration — not a stable machine-readable feed — so they are not tracked here. - Google's user-triggered fetchers —
user-triggered-fetchers.jsonleaves from shared App Engine (*.gae.googleusercontent.com) space where customer workloads also run, so it is excluded outright rather than made opt-in. - Azure service tags / GCP
cloud.json/ AWSAMAZON,EC2— customer compute by definition. Never ingested, in any file.
generators/<provider>.py one generator per provider (standalone-runnable)
generators/_common.py shared fetch/whois/parse/collapse/subtract/write helpers
generators/run_all.py runs every generator + builds all-safe.txt
lists/<provider>.txt committed output, one per provider
lists/all-safe.txt aggregate of the SAFE lists only
tests/test_transforms.py synthetic-payload unit tests for every transform
.github/workflows/update.yml 6-hourly refresh + commit
- Python 3 standard library only (
urllib,socket,json,ipaddress). No deps. - Fetches retry 3× with exponential backoff and fail loudly — a silently empty exclusion feed would let blocked IPs through downstream. The whois path (Meta) has the same policy, plus a floor on the number of validated routes so a truncated read can't quietly shrink the feed.
- Never writes an empty list: a bad/partial fetch raises before write and the empty-list guard refuses to clobber a good committed file.
- Dual-stack: IPv4 and IPv6 collected and collapsed independently
(
ipaddress.collapse_addressesis single-family), output v4 then v6. - Defensive parsing: non-IP strings (SSH keys, hostnames, coordinates,
nulls) are skipped viatry/except ValueError, never regex guessing. - CIDR subtraction (e.g.
goog − cloud) usesaddress_exclude/subnet_ofcontainment — never string comparison. Partial carves like8.8.8.0/24 − 8.8.8.128/25 = 8.8.8.0/25are exact. - Deterministic output: collapsed, deduped, ascending per family — identical input yields byte-identical files.
- Freshness matters more than it used to. Several providers (OpenAI, Stripe, Okta, Anthropic, Perplexity, DuckDuckGo) publish addresses that sit inside a public cloud. Those are theirs today; once released they can be reassigned to another tenant. That is precisely why nothing here is hand-maintained and every list is regenerated from the provider's own feed every 6 hours.
# everything (writes lists/*.txt + all-safe.txt):
python3 generators/run_all.py
# a single provider:
python3 generators/google.py
python3 generators/meta.py # needs outbound TCP/43 to whois.radb.net
# tests (no network needed):
python3 tests/test_transforms.py.github/workflows/update.yml runs every 6 hours (and on demand) on
ubuntu-latest, regenerates all lists, runs the unit tests, and commits changes
to lists/*.txt via
git-auto-commit-action.
If any single provider fails, the others are still committed but the run is
marked red. A keep-alive step re-enables the schedule so GitHub doesn't
auto-disable it after 60 days of inactivity.