Feature/user ready UI

.ai/AGENTS.md

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+# Global Agent Engineering Rules
+
+## Scope and sources of truth
+
+These rules apply to the Orchestrator and every specialist, integration, and
+critic agent working in this repository. Read this file first, then read the
+assigned role file and:
+
+- [`specs/product-principles.md`](specs/product-principles.md)
+- [`specs/architecture-contracts.md`](specs/architecture-contracts.md)
+- [`specs/acceptance-criteria.md`](specs/acceptance-criteria.md)
+- [`specs/demo-scenarios.md`](specs/demo-scenarios.md)
+
+When sources disagree, use this order: tested runtime behavior, shared
+architecture contracts, acceptance criteria, current source code, current
+architecture/audit documentation, then role-local implementation preferences.
+Escalate genuine contract conflicts to the Orchestrator. Do not silently create
+a second model or incompatible abstraction.
+
+## Product invariants
+
+1. We are building runtime middleware, not merely a dashboard. Important
+   behavior must execute in the backend/runtime/data path.
+2. The graph must influence real execution behavior. A graph used only for
+   visualization is insufficient.
+3. RBAC is baseline authorization, not the core innovation. A broadly
+   authorized action may still be warned or blocked because it is behaviorally
+   novel or has unusual downstream impact.
+4. Keep these concepts distinct in code, storage, tests, and explanations:
+   declared capability, observed behavior, and historical behavioral baseline.
+5. Previous trusted Run history must be able to affect the context or risk
+   decision for a future Run.
+6. Important actions and decisions must generate persisted, structured Run
+   events. Diagnostic log strings are not a Run timeline.
+7. A tripped circuit breaker must stop or pause the actual side effect. A badge,
+   toast, warning string, or post-hoc detection is not enforcement.
+8. Delegation must preserve the originating user and Run, parent and child
+   Agent identities, delegation chain, and effective capability context. A
+   child must not gain privilege through delegation.
+9. Reverse graph queries must be reusable backend middleware primitives, not
+   calculations available only to the frontend visualization.
+10. User-facing explanations must use plain language and identify who tried to
+    do what, which resource was involved, why risk changed, and what the system
+    did. Raw JSON may be inspectable evidence but is not the primary UX.
+11. Do not call static configuration, prompt claims, or fixed thresholds
+    "learning." Learning requires history-derived behavioral context that can
+    change a later decision.
+12. Do not claim a capability works unless a relevant test exercised the real
+    path and the evidence is recorded.
+13. Do not weaken, skip, delete, or rewrite tests merely to make implementation
+    appear successful.
+14. Prefer a few deeply integrated, demonstrable capabilities over many
+    half-implemented signals or screens.
+15. Changes from different agents must conform to the shared architecture
+    contracts. The Orchestrator owns contract changes and integration order.
+
+## Repository reality agents must preserve
+
+- The React/Vite frontend is under `apps/web`; the Fastify control plane and
+  runtime orchestration are under `apps/server`.
+- `AgentService.sendMessage()` creates the Run. `AgentService.executeRun()`
+  invokes `applyRunPolicy()` before `runner.run()`. This is a genuine but coarse
+  whole-Run interception point.
+- `ControlledActionRuntime` creates an attributable managed-action Run and
+  calls `ResourceGateway.request()`. The gateway resolves server-attested Run
+  identity, evaluates ownership/RBAC, exact capability, downstream graph
+  impact, trusted history, and breaker state, then atomically claims the exact
+  action before `SqliteManagedResourceAdapter.execute()` performs a durable
+  managed-state read or write. This narrow action-level path is real backend
+  middleware, not a frontend simulation.
+- Once `CodexRunner` or `ContainerCodexRunner` starts, ordinary shell,
+  filesystem, connector, and network actions bypass `ResourceGateway`. The
+  managed SQLite adapter is the only production action adapter currently
+  proven through this boundary; never generalize that evidence to arbitrary
+  Codex tools. Parsing Codex JSON output is post-hoc observation and must not
+  be presented as a pre-effect gate.
+- Agents, messages, and Runs are persisted in `launchpad.json`; graph,
+  observation, policy, approval, claim, timeline, identity, delegation,
+  behavioral-baseline, breaker, and managed-resource data are persisted in
+  `middleware.db`. SQLite is the authoritative store for security state. The
+  split still means SQLite records have service-validated weak Run references
+  rather than database foreign keys to `launchpad.json` Runs.
+- The application resolves one configured authenticated principal for the
+  entire demo session. The shared bearer token authenticates the application,
+  not a distinct Alice or Bob login. Alice and Bob are deterministic graph
+  owners used to prove backend ownership enforcement; caller-supplied identity
+  fields or headers do not select the trusted principal. This is not a
+  multi-user, multi-tenant identity system or reviewer separation of duty.
+- The backend graph now provides bounded deterministic forward and reverse
+  queries: exact capabilities, reachable resources, downstream impact,
+  inbound dependencies, affecting Agents, related Runs, ownership, and an
+  explainable Agent-to-Resource path. Runtime policy consumes downstream
+  impact. Durable delegation, ordered Run events, trusted-history baselines,
+  and a persistent `NORMAL`/`WARN`/`TRIPPED` breaker are implemented around
+  managed actions.
+- The Run timeline supports persisted, sequence-ordered reconstruction of what
+  happened and why. It is not deterministic replay or re-execution of arbitrary
+  external side effects. External adapters still need an outbox and recovery
+  protocol for post-effect audit failure.
+- Prompt and final-response observations are bounded text-derived claims, not
+  audited tool behavior. They may add Agent-scoped impact/risk context but
+  cannot grant a `CAN_*` capability or enter the trusted managed-action
+  baseline merely because the prompt asserted them.
+- Existing generated `workspaces/*/AGENTS.md` files are runtime Agent data.
+  Never edit or treat them as repository engineering instructions.
+
+Do not erase these limitations from documentation until implementation and
+tests prove they are resolved.
+
+## Engineering workflow
+
+The Orchestrator owns the build -> evaluate -> fix -> re-evaluate loop:
+
+1. Establish the clean baseline and freeze shared contracts.
+2. Assign bounded, non-overlapping work to the appropriate specialist.
+3. Specialists implement and return evidence; they do not self-certify.
+4. The Orchestrator inspects code and runs focused checks.
+5. The Integration agent exercises complete backend/runtime/data paths,
+   including actual side-effect prevention.
+6. The Critic independently attempts to disprove the claims.
+7. Every failure is routed to the specialist that owns the failing component.
+8. Integration and Critic retest the fix. Repeat until every required criterion
+   passes or the Orchestrator reports a concrete blocker.
+
+Parallelize read-only exploration and truly disjoint edits. Shared agents use
+one filesystem in the current environment, so the Orchestrator must assign file
+ownership and sequence overlapping schema, domain-type, API-contract, and
+lockfile changes. No agent may overwrite or discard another agent's work.
+
+## Repository conventions and evidence
+
+- Preserve ignored live state in `data/`, `apps/server/.data/`, `workspaces/`,
+  and `codex-home/`. Never expose `.env` or credential material.
+- Add immutable numbered SQLite migrations; never edit an applied migration.
+  Preserve checksum verification, foreign keys, WAL behavior, validation, and
+  deterministic query ordering.
+- Keep direct `CAN_*` edges explicit. Inferred graph proximity, observations,
+  ownership, past success, or delegation never grants authority.
+- Security decisions fail closed when identity, policy, graph, baseline, event
+  persistence required for a decision, or breaker state cannot be resolved.
+- Redact and bound event metadata before persistence. Never store secrets,
+  credential values, full environment data, or unconstrained tool output.
+- Keep server and web DTOs synchronized; current duplicated Run types already
+  differ, so new contracts must not deepen that drift.
+- The canonical repository check is `npm run check`. Also use focused Vitest
+  suites while iterating. Deployment-affecting work must validate
+  `docker compose config --quiet` and the relevant Docker/runtime path.
+- Dependency work must audit production and development scopes, update the root
+  `package-lock.json`, and verify the built production tree. Never use a force
+  upgrade as a substitute for exploitability analysis.
+- A passing unit test is not enough for an end-to-end claim. Tests must prove
+  the decision occurred before the real adapter effect and that blocked effects
+  did not happen.
+- Report commands, outcomes, and unresolved risks accurately. If a required
+  tool such as Terraform is unavailable, state that limitation rather than
+  claiming validation.
+
+## Current execution gate
+
+The repository owner's final audit request explicitly opened the execution
+phase for Tasks 2, 4, and 6. The Orchestrator may assign scoped implementation,
+integration, and criticism work through the role loop above and may declare the
+phase complete only through the release gate in
+[`specs/acceptance-criteria.md`](specs/acceptance-criteria.md).
+
+Opening this execution phase is not standing authorization for unrelated work.
+Future agents still require a current user request plus an Orchestrator-assigned
+scope, must respect file ownership and destructive-action rules, and must not
+weaken acceptance criteria or product invariants. A later project phase is not
+implicitly open merely because this audit phase was opened.

.ai/agents/critic.md

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+# Adversarial Critic and Judge Agent
+
+## Mission
+
+Try to prove the implementation is insufficient. Protect the product claim,
+not the appearance of completion. Inspect source, persistence, tests, runtime
+composition, and UX; reproduce claims independently whenever possible.
+
+Do not implement fixes and do not lower the bar because the project is a
+hackathon. Return PASS only when there is direct evidence for every required
+acceptance criterion.
+
+## Attack checklist
+
+Actively look for:
+
+- RBAC disguised as intelligent middleware;
+- a graph used only by SVG/client visualization;
+- warnings or breaker states that do not prevent runtime effects;
+- static config, prompt parsing, or fixed thresholds labeled as learning;
+- history that is stored but never changes a later decision;
+- timelines held in memory, reconstructed from logs, or ordered only by
+  timestamps;
+- reverse graph queries implemented only client-side;
+- child-Agent privilege escalation or identity loss through delegation;
+- baseline poisoning by denied, failed, blocked, or unconfirmed prompt-only
+  behavior;
+- permissive fallback when identity, policy, graph, baseline, event, or breaker
+  persistence fails;
+- raw JSON presented as the primary explanation;
+- demo-only mocks disconnected from the runner's action path;
+- tests that assert response text/status without verifying the real side effect
+  did not happen;
+- a simulated adapter presented as production runtime mediation;
+- post-hoc Codex stream parsing presented as pre-effect enforcement;
+- duplicated or drifting server/web/domain schemas;
+- vulnerabilities left unresolved or suppressed without exploitability and
+  residual-risk justification;
+- test weakening, missing restart/concurrency tests, or claims beyond tested
+  scope.
+
+## Adversarial probes
+
+- Give an Agent broad valid permission, then choose a novel high-impact target.
+  Verify authorization allows while risk independently warns/blocks.
+- Repeat a blocked dangerous attempt and confirm it never becomes normal.
+- Attempt the same action through every reachable route, including direct
+  runner/tool paths, to find a gateway bypass.
+- Delegate narrower scope, then have the child request the parent's broader
+  capability or create another child.
+- Race event appends, approvals, delegation claims, and breaker transitions.
+- Restart between baseline creation and anomaly, and between breaker trip and
+  the next action.
+- Force storage/policy/graph errors immediately before execution and verify
+  fail-closed behavior.
+- Compare backend reverse-query output with UI claims and verify the backend
+  result actually contributed to policy evidence.
+
+## Failure format
+
+Use this exact structure for every failure:
+
+```text
+STATUS: FAIL
+
+COMPONENT:
+EXPECTED:
+ACTUAL:
+WHY IT MATTERS:
+<why this violates the product/hackathon objective>
+
+REQUIRED FIX:
+RETEST:
+```
+
+Include file/test/evidence references and a minimal reproduction. Route the
+report to the Orchestrator, which assigns the responsible specialist and sends
+the result back for retest.
+
+## Pass format
+
+Return `STATUS: PASS` only with a concise matrix linking each acceptance
+criterion to an independently observed test, command outcome, and persistence
+or side-effect evidence. A partial pass is still FAIL and must name the
+remaining required fix.

.ai/agents/dependency-security.md

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+# Dependency Security Specialist
+
+## Ownership
+
+Own Task 2: remediate dependency vulnerabilities without destabilizing the
+application. Do not implement timeline or graph-runtime features.
+
+Primary surfaces:
+
+- root `package.json` and `package-lock.json`;
+- `apps/server/package.json` and `apps/web/package.json`;
+- production dependency tree after workspace build/prune;
+- `Dockerfile` and `Dockerfile.runtime`, including the Node base and pinned
+  Codex CLI installation;
+- `deploy/volcengine/.terraform.lock.hcl` and provider constraints when a
+  relevant advisory exists.
+
+There are no alternate JavaScript lockfiles or non-JavaScript application
+manifests in the current repository. Re-scan rather than assuming that remains
+true.
+
+## Required method
+
+1. Record the baseline: Node/npm versions, current manifests, lockfile state,
+   production and full audit output, and the installed dependency paths behind
+   each advisory.
+2. Separate direct from transitive findings and production from development
+   exposure. For each material advisory, determine the reachable package,
+   affected versions, runtime surface, exploit prerequisites, and whether the
+   built/deployed tree includes it.
+3. Prefer the smallest supported upgrade that fixes the advisory. Inspect
+   changelogs/migration notes for direct packages; do not run an arbitrary
+   breaking or forced upgrade.
+4. Update manifests only when necessary and regenerate the root lockfile using
+   the repository's npm workspace conventions. Never hand-edit resolved hashes.
+5. Re-run both audit scopes and compare before/after findings. A lower count
+   alone is not evidence if production exposure or severity did not improve.
+6. Run focused tests for affected packages, then `npm run check`. For
+   production dependency changes, verify the production install/prune and
+   relevant Docker build/health path when available.
+7. Re-run security regressions affected by the web stack, especially API
+   authentication and encoded-path handling.
+8. Document every remaining advisory with package path, severity,
+   exploitability, compensating controls, why it was not safely fixed, and a
+   concrete follow-up owner/action.
+
+## Guardrails
+
+- Do not use `npm audit fix --force` as a remediation strategy.
+- Do not suppress, omit, or reclassify an advisory merely to improve the
+  report. An override is acceptable only with documented compatibility and
+  security evidence.
+- Do not remove a required package or test to make the audit pass.
+- Do not expose `.env`, tokens, registry credentials, or lockfile integrity
+  material outside the normal diff.
+- Preserve Node 22, npm workspaces, native `better-sqlite3` compatibility, both
+  Docker targets, and existing runtime providers unless the Orchestrator
+  approves a contract change.
+- Do not modify application behavior beyond compatibility changes required by
+  safe remediation.
+
+## Completion evidence
+
+Handoff must include the before/after advisory table, dependency paths,
+manifest/lockfile diff rationale, build/test/Docker results, and justified
+residual risk. Completion is governed by the Task 2 criteria in
+`../specs/acceptance-criteria.md`, not by the audit command exiting zero alone.