Everything here runs on any Rand chain (no program_state section needed).
| example | shows |
|---|---|
threshold/ |
a Rust guest; a deploy-time public input; private inputs that never leave the prover; a call whose receipt proves a fact without revealing the data; refusing by having no proof |
spl-token/ |
a Solana program (the SPL Token ELF) translated to RISC-V by sbpf2rv, run against the sBPF interpreter for parity, and deployed with the ELF as its public input |
eligibility/ |
prove a predicate (born on or before a cutoff) about a credential in an issuer's Poseidon2 Merkle tree, revealing neither the credential nor which one; the use-case page's "prove eligibility without surrendering identity" |
private-join/ |
a private set intersection, or a two-sided match, over two parties' committed lists: the commitments are the public input, the receipt is the count (or match / no match) and nothing else |
credit-score/ |
a lender's published scoring model over a borrower's private statements: the receipt is the band and a commitment to the statements; rand call --auditor for a regulator who alone may open them |
sealed-auction/ |
a sealed-bid second-price auction (or, flipped, a sealed request-for-quote): bids are private inputs, the receipt is the winner, the clearing price and a fold of every bid's commitment, so no bid can be dropped or misreported |
ballot/ |
a private ballot with a public tally: ballots are private inputs, the roll is a committed digest in the public input, the receipt is the weighted totals; the use-case page's "governance without a bribe market", with what this version does and does not deliver |
rpl-token/ |
an RPL token: fixed supply or mintable by a post-quantum key; private transfers; burning |
The five examples from eligibility/ on illustrate use cases from
randprotocol.org/usecases; each README quotes the sentence it
illustrates and says plainly what the program does and does not achieve. All of them read two
random blinding words first: a call's proof leaks an unsalted function of its input words, so
a program over a few small words would otherwise be open to brute force.
rand program deploy image.bin [--public words] # the chain stores the code by its hash
rand call <id> --input w0 --input w1 … # prove locally, pay from a bundle, get a receipt
- The wallet runs the program in the zkVM on your private inputs and proves the run. Only
the proof, the outputs and a salted commitment to the inputs (
H_IN) leave your machine. - It pays the call's fee from a shielded bundle, proved too.
- The chain verifies both proofs and records a receipt: program, outputs, tier,
H_IN.
A program is stateless: a call writes only its receipt, and nothing a call does is visible to
the next one. For storage and balances held by a program, see ../rpl2.
By default rand call also publishes the call's inputs sealed to your own key (an input
envelope, rand open-call <tx> reopens it); --no-envelope keeps even that off chain.
On Rand a token is not a contract. Programs have no storage to keep balances in, and a public
balance table would make tokens the one transparent asset on a shielded chain. An RPL token is
instead a registry entry — name, symbol, decimals, mint authority, public total supply — and its
balances are ordinary shielded notes in the same tree as RAND. A transfer is the same four-slot
bundle a RAND transfer is, and does not say which asset moved. See rpl-token/.